> For the complete documentation index, see [llms.txt](https://argon-4.gitbook.io/argon-docs/llms.txt). Markdown versions of documentation pages are available by appending `.md` to page URLs; this page is available as [Markdown](https://argon-4.gitbook.io/argon-docs/developers/security.md).

# Security reporting

Report a vulnerability in Enclave or SureSign, what to expect, what is in scope, and where the current residual risk is written down.

## Report a vulnerability

If you believe you have found a security problem in Enclave or SureSign, please report it privately. Do not open a public issue, and do not post details anywhere public until a fix has shipped.

**Email:** <support@onargon.com> with the subject line beginning `SECURITY`.

Include what you can: the version (Settings → About), the network, steps to reproduce, the transaction id or review hash if one is involved, and your assessment of impact. If you have a proof of concept, attach it or describe how to obtain it; do not exercise it against other people's funds.

You will receive an acknowledgement, a severity assessment, and a fix timeline. Fixes for anything that could cause a signature the user did not approve are treated as P0: a hotfix release under the never-auto-merge rule, and a note in the release.

Please give reasonable time for a fix before public disclosure. Credit is offered in the release notes if you want it.

## Scope

**In scope**

* Anything that lets a transaction be signed that differs from the ReviewPlan the user approved.
* Anything that lets a page or dApp obtain a signature without a review, forge its origin, or escalate a connection grant.
* Secret exposure: seed, private keys, vault data key, password, passkey output, decrypted Deal Desk state, in any form (memory disclosure through a page, storage, logs, network).
* Vault weaknesses: key derivation, authenticated encryption, slot handling.
* Kernel refusals that can be bypassed: unknown templates spent, sighash substituted, change mis-derived, fee or mass miscomputed, protocol conservation broken.
* Deal Desk: message forgery that passes verification, a deal card that re-derives to a wrong lock, a stranger opening a room.
* Supply chain: the build, the release script, dependency pins, the ABI check.

**Out of scope**

* A fully compromised operating system or browser while the wallet is unlocked (documented as the ceiling of the model).
* Bugs in third-party providers (Kat Bridge, Zealous Swap, Lynx, Kaskad, INS, indexers, nodes) that do not involve Enclave misrepresenting them. Please report those to the provider; do tell us if Enclave's review could have been clearer about them.
* Phishing sites, social engineering, and lost recovery phrases.
* Denial of service against public nodes and indexers.

## What we do not have yet

Enclave has not yet had an independent third-party security review, and there is no bug bounty programme at this time. Both are planned follow-ups to the current release (see [SureSign → Roadmap](/argon-docs/suresign/roadmap.md)). Until then, the source is public, the builds are reproducible, and the engineering record keeps a **residual-risk note** (`docs/RELEASE_SECURITY.md`) written so that a reviewer can start from what the team already knows rather than from zero.

## Security-relevant design records

| Document                                         | Contents                                                  |
| ------------------------------------------------ | --------------------------------------------------------- |
| `docs/SECURITY_INVARIANTS.md`                    | The twenty-five invariants                                |
| `docs/THREAT_MODEL.md`                           | Named threats, controls, open items                       |
| `docs/ARCHITECTURE.md`                           | The four zones and their boundaries                       |
| `docs/VAULT.md`, ADR 0003, ADR 0006              | The envelope vault                                        |
| `docs/TRANSACTION_POLICY.md`, ADR 0005, ADR 0010 | Review binding and packages                               |
| `docs/RELEASE_SECURITY.md`, ADR 0016             | Release approval, signing, reproducibility, residual risk |
| `docs/TESTING.md`                                | Test categories, adversarial corpus, qualification        |

## Release integrity

Tags are SSH-signed against `docs/ALLOWED_SIGNERS`; releases are reproducible; the store build is the release build. See [Verify a release](/argon-docs/developers/verify-a-release.md). The `0.9.x` beta has one publisher; from `1.0.0`, two.